Applications of reponsive regulatory theory in Australia and overseas by Australian National University. Regulatory Institutions Network et al.
 APPLICATIONS OF RESPONSIVE 
REGULATORY THEORY IN AUSTRALIA 
AND OVERSEAS 
Charlotte Wood, Mary Ivec, Jenny Job & 
Valerie Braithwaite 
 
 
 
Occasional Paper 15  
June 2010 
 1 
TABLE	  OF	  CONTENTS	  
	  INTRODUCTION	   3	  
AUSTRALIAN	  EXAMPLES	   5	  
HEALTH	  AND	  SAFETY	   5	  AUSTRALIA	  AND	  NEW	  ZEALAND	  FOOD	  SAFETY	  REGULATION	   5	  OCCUPATIONAL	  HEALTH	  AND	  SAFETY	   6	  OFFICE	  OF	  THE	  GENE	  TECHNOLOGY	  REGULATOR	  (OGTR)	   9	  QUEENSLAND	  HEALTH	  QUALITY	  AND	  COMPLAINTS	  COMMISSION	   10	  
CORPORATIONS	  AND	  FINANCE	   11	  THE	  AUSTRALIAN	  COMPETITION	  AND	  CONSUMER	  COMMISSION	  (ACCC)	   11	  AUSTRALIAN	  SECURITIES	  AND	  INVESTMENT	  COMMISSION	  (ASIC)	   12	  AUSTRALIAN	  TAXATION	  OFFICE	  (ATO)	   13	  
AUSTRALIAN	  COMMUNICATIONS	  AND	  MEDIA	  AUTHORITY	  (ACMA)	   15	  
ANTI-­CORRUPTION	  AGENCIES	  (ACAS)	   16	  
ADMINISTRATIVE	  REVIEW	  COUNCIL	  (ARC)	   19	  
AUSTRALIAN	  QUARANTINE	  AND	  INSPECTION	  SERVICE	  (AQIS)	   19	  
THE	  NSW	  GOVERNMENT’S	  ‘BETTER	  REGULATION	  OFFICE’	   21	  
OFFICE	  OF	  TRANSPORT	  SECURITY	  (OTS)	   22	  
CHILDREN	  AND	  YOUNG	  PEOPLE	   22	  FAMILY	  GROUP	  CONFERENCING	   22	  OFFICE	  FOR	  CHILDREN,	  YOUTH	  AND	  FAMILY	  SUPPORT:	  CHILDREN’S	  POLICY	  AND	  REGULATION	  UNIT	  (CPRU)	   24	  FURTHER	  INFORMATION	  ON	  RESPONSIVE	  APPROACHES	  TO	  CHILD	  PROTECTION:	   26	  
ENVIRONMENT	   26	  SOUTH	  AUSTRALIAN	  ENVIRONMENT	  PROTECTION	  AGENCY	  (EPA)	   26	  
PRIVACY	   28	  AUSTRALIAN	  PRIVACY	  FOUNDATION	   28	  THE	  PRIVACY	  ACT	   28	  
INTERNATIONAL	  EXAMPLES	   30	  
BRITAIN	   30	  THE	  HAMPTON	  REVIEW	  (2005):	  “REDUCING	  ADMINISTRATIVE	  BURDENS:	  EFFECTIVE	  INSPECTION	  AND	  ENFORCEMENT”	   30	  THE	  MACRORY	  REVIEW	  (2006):	  “REGULATORY	  JUSTICE:	  MAKING	  SANCTIONS	  EFFECTIVE”	   31	  THE	  UK	  OFFICE	  OF	  COMMUNICATIONS	  (OFCOM)	   33	  THE	  REGULATORY	  ENFORCEMENT	  &	  SANCTIONS	  ACT	  (RESA)	  2008	   33	  
CANADA	   34	  ONTARIO	  SECURITIES	  COMMISSION	  (OSC)	   34	  NOVA	  SCOTIA’S	  ENVIRONMENTAL	  COMPLIANCE	  MODEL	   35	  
INDONESIA	   36	  INDONESIAN	  MINISTRY	  OF	  FINANCE	   36	  
NEW	  ZEALAND	   37	  NEW	  ZEALAND	  ADVERTISING	  STANDARDS	  AUTHORITY	   37	  NEW	  ZEALAND	  INLAND	  REVENUE	  DEPARTMENT	   39	  NEW	  ZEALAND	  LIQUOR	  SALES	   41	  NEW	  ZEALAND	  MINISTRY	  OF	  CONSUMER	  AFFAIRS	  (MCA)	   41	  WORKPLACE	  HEALTH	  AND	  SAFETY	   43	  
THE	  EUROPEAN	  UNION	   43	  REACH:	  CHEMICAL	  REGULATION	  POLICY	   43	  
 2 
THE	  NETHERLANDS	   44	  DUTCH	  FOOD	  AND	  CONSUMER	  PRODUCT	  SAFETY	  AUTHORITY	   44	  THE	  TABLE	  OF	  ELEVEN	   45	  
THE	  UNITED	  STATES	   46	  OREGON	  PATIENT	  SAFETY	  COMMISSION	   46	  
	  
 
	  
 3 
INTRODUCTION	  
 
The basic principle of responsive regulation is that regulators should be responsive to 
the culture, conduct and context of those they seek to regulate when deciding whether 
a more or less interventionist response is needed. In other words, “soft words before 
hard words, and carrots before sticks”.1 It also recognises the need for a diversity of 
regulatory strategies and the need for all strategies to be practically grounded and 
context appropriate.2 
The model was first developed by Braithwaite and Ayres in their book Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, however it is important to 
emphasise that the development of responsive regulation as a theory has been and 
continues to be a collective effort, contributed to by numerous scholars and 
institutions, the most important early development being Neil Gunningham, Peter 
Grabosky and Darren Sinclair's Smart Regulation (1998) and the most recent 
developments being John Braithwaite’s Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas 
for Making it Work Better (2008) and Valerie Braithwaite’s Defiance in Taxation and 
Governance (2009). 
The basic principles of responsive regulation are simply illustrated in Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s widely recognised “regulatory pyramid” (below). At the base are 
advisory and persuasive measures, in the middle are mild administrative sanctions and 
at the top are more punitive sanctions, determined to be sufficiently undesirable to 
halt the behaviour of the most determined offenders. According to its authors, 
regulators should focus most of their activity at the bottom and only escalate measures 
if absolutely necessary and de-escalate when possible. 3 The preference for being at 
the bottom of the pyramid is a presumptive preference that will often be overridden. 
Pyramids are more likely to be effective when they have a credible enforcement peak.  
 
                                                
1Healy, J. and J. Braithwaite, (2006) “Designing safer health care through responsive regulation”, The 
Medical Journal of Australia, 184(10 Suppl) S56-S59, online at: 
<http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/184_10_150506/hea11015_fm.html#0_pgfId-1091789> 
2 Ibid and Sparrow, M. (2000) “The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Managing Problems and 
Managing Compliance, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.  
3 Gunningham, N. (2007) “Prosecution for OHS Offences: Deterrent or Disincentive”, Sydney Law 
Review, 29, 359-390, online at: 
<http://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/ngunningham/publications/PDFs/2007_Gunningham_PDD_SLR.pdf> 
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The following document outlines some examples of responsive regulation 
applications, both in Australia and overseas. The document tends not to comment 
conclusively on the success of the approach’s application. Often it is difficult to assess 
even whether responsive regulation principles have been translated into practice in 
each example or whether they have simply been endorsed aspirationally. Finally, it 
should be noted that the list is not exhaustive. It simply provides some examples that 
practitioners might be able to discuss with colleagues who have attempted to 
implement the approach.  
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AUSTRALIAN	  EXAMPLES	  
 
HEALTH AND SAFETY 
 
Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Food	  Safety	  Regulation	  
 
In their recent research into the regulatory measures imposed upon business by 
Australian and New Zealand food safety regulators, Australia’s Productivity 
Commission (PC) highlighted a growing movement towards more responsive and 
self-regulatory strategies. 
 
The PC found that Australian and New Zealand regulators generally use a 
cooperative, graduated approach to achieving compliance. This means that they are 
increasingly making efforts to deliver outcomes which minimise adverse impacts on 
business and provide assistance with compliance.  
 
Most regulators included in the study accepted that effective enforcement must 
include both ‘deterrence’ and ‘education or persuasion’ strategies. They also believed 
that enforcement policies should consist of an escalation of sanctions as depicted in 
the following pyramid (and which was included in their final report): 
 
 
 
The PC also found that regulators in all jurisdictions favoured the use of education 
and warnings over site-inspections and punitive approaches. For example, data 
collected for the NSW Food Authority, Victorian Department of Health and NT 
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Department of Health and Families indicates a preference for education and informal 
advice over verbal warnings and a preference for verbal over written warnings. 
 
For more information: 
Productivity Commission (2009) Performance Benchmarking of Australian and New 
Zealand Business Regulation: Food Safety Research Report, Melbourne: 
Commonwealth of Australia, online at: 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/93503/food-safety-report.pdf> 
 
Occupational	  Health	  and	  Safety	  
 
Australia’s OHS Regulatory Framework is based upon a Pyramid of Enforcement. 
The Pyramid represents the hierarchy of documents and strategies that comprise the 
regulatory framework. The legal status of the documents and severity of the 
approaches increases the higher one moves up the pyramid.  
As displayed by Comcare: 
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As displayed by Safe Work Australia: 
 
 
 
The Safe Work Australia Website states: “regulators must balance the use of 
enforcement strategies which address the minority of flagrant offenders, with the need 
to encourage and help the majority of employers [who] comply voluntarily”. The 
website also cites Braithwaite and Ayres’ point that “good regulation means invoking 
different strategies depending upon whether or not business has a self-interest (or 
perceives itself as having a self-interest) in improving OHS outcomes” (Braithwaite 
and Ayres 1992). 
 
Case-Study 1: Queensland Workplace Health and Safety: 
 
Queensland’s Workplace Health and Safety Compliance and Management Policy is 
based on the national policy however it incorporates its own "Compliance Pyramid" 
which details three levels of response:  
 
1. encouraging and assisting compliance at the base, 
2. directing compliance in the middle and 
3. sanctions at the apex. 
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Case study 2: Mining OHS 
 
Efforts have been made to move towards a more responsive regulatory approach in 
relation to Mining OHS. 
 
In its 2005 enforcement guidelines for the Mine Health and Safety Act, The 
Department of Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate recommended that: 
 
“…a graduated series of options [be] adopted with consultation and verbal directions 
as the starting point, progressing through statutory instructions to order compliance, 
or to an order to halt or suspend operations at a mine or an affected area of a mine; 
and finally, the recommendation of an administrative fine or prosecution for failure to 
comply.” 
 
This approach is graphically illustrated on page 7 of the Inspectorate’s guidelines as a 
simplified version of the responsive regulation pyramid: 
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Unfortunately though, as Gunningham (2007) points out, none of Australia’s three 
mining states have managed to achieve a workable balance between the bottom layer 
of “advise and persuade” (as in Queensland and WA), and the harder-edged top layer 
(e.g. as in NSW Justice Staunton’s judgement over the Gretley Mining Disaster in 
2004).  
 
For more information: 
Comcare, A practical guide to the OHS regulatory framework, Commonwealth 
Government, online at: 
<http://www.comcare.gov.au/safety__and__prevention/managing_OHS/ohs_regulator
y_framework/a_practical_guide_to_the_ohs_regulatory_framework> 
 
Hermanus, M.A. (2005) Guideline for Enforcement of the Mine Health and Safety 
Act, Department of Minerals and Energy, online at: 
<http://www.dme.gov.za/pdfs/mhs/guidelines/guideline_enforcement_mhs_act.pdf> 
 
Gunningham, N. (2007) "Prosecution for OHS Offences: Deterrent or Disincentive?", 
Sydney Law Review, 29(3): 359-390, online at: 
<http://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/ngunningham/publications/PDFs/2007_Gunningham
_PDD_SLR.pdf> 
 
Gunningham, N. and D. Sinclair (2007) “Responsive OHS Regulation in the Mining 
Sector”, National Research Centre for OHS Regulation Working Paper 56, 
Regulatory Institutions Network, online at: 
<http://ohs.anu.edu.au/publications/pdf/wp%2056%20-
%20Gunningham%20and%20Sinclair.pdf> 
 
Queensland Government (2009) Compliance and Management Policy 2009, 
Queensland Workplace Health and Safety, Electrical Safety and Dangerous Goods 
Safety Management, online at: 
<http://www.deir.qld.gov.au/workplace/resources/pdfs/enforcement_framework_guid
e2009.pdf> 
 
Safe Work Australia (2009) Part 3 – On-the-spot fines within a broader OHS policy 
framework, Commonwealth Government, online at: 
<http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/swa/AboutUs/Publications/ArchivedDocument
s/OnTheSpotFinesResearchReport/Part3-On-the-
spotfineswithinabroaderOHSpolicyframework.htm> 
 
Office	  of	  the	  Gene	  Technology	  Regulator	  (OGTR)	  
 
In its 2002 Draft Monitoring and Compliance Framework, the OGTR includes a 
Compliance Pyramid featuring a hierarchy of compliance enforcement strategies, 
which escalate in severity and aim to give “accredited organisations every 
opportunity to comply”.  
 
It is the OGTR’s goal to maintain the majority of its regulatory activity at the base of 
the pyramid. As such, their compliance model is accompanied by efforts to foster, in 
accredited organisations, a corporate culture of risk management and an enabling 
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environment, underpinned by effective education, which reduces the potential for 
non-compliance.  
 
 
 
For more information: 
Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2002) Monitoring and Compliance 
Framework: In accordance with the Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth), a working 
document, 26 July, online at: 
<http://www.biosafety.gov.cn/image20010518/5066.pdf> 
 
Queensland	  Health	  Quality	  and	  Complaints	  Commission	  	  
 
In 2008, the Commission developed a ‘responsive regulation’ model in an effort to 
hand greater autonomy to healthcare providers so that it could assume more of an 
oversight, referral and investigative role. They state that the model has “helped us 
bring together our two core roles – complaint and investigation management, and 
standard-setting and quality improvement,” however it is too early to say how 
effective the model will be. According to their 08-09 annual report, this is the first 
time that the responsive regulation model has been used in healthcare.  
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For more information: 
Health Quality and Complaints Commission (2009) “Chapter 4: Preventing” in 
Annual Report 08-09, Queensland Government, online at: 
<http://www.hqcc.qld.gov.au//_uploads/29407Preventing.pdf> 
CORPORATIONS AND FINANCE 
 
The	  Australian	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Commission	  (ACCC)	  
 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission uses a version of the 
compliance pyramid to guide its regulatory operations. 
 
According to Louise Sylvan, ACCC Deputy Chair: 
“… for those of you who work internationally as well as nationally, you’ll encounter 
this compliance pyramid, or enforcement pyramid as it is sometimes called, 
everywhere in the world now...” 
 
 
ACCC Regulatory Pyramid 
 
The preference for this voluntary compliance approach was first expressed in 2003 by 
the ACCC’s then Chairman Graham Samuel.  
 
To measure the effectiveness of the ACCC’s enforcement strategies on compliance 
with the Trade Practices Act, in 2004, RegNet and the ACCC embarked upon a joint 
research project called the “ACCC Enforcement and Compliance Project”. For more 
information about the project, see Melbourne Law School (2009) and Parker et al 
(2004) below. 
 
For more information:  
Grant, R. (2005) “The ACCC’s regulatory strategy”, in Australia’s corporate 
regulators – the ACCC, ASIC and APRA, Research Brief no. 16 2004-05, online at the 
Parliamentary Library of Australia: <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/RB/2004-
05/05rb16.htm#acccs> 
 
Melbourne Law School (2009) “The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission Enforcement and Compliance Project”, Melbourne University, online at:  
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<http://www.cartel.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/related-projects/the-australian-
competition-and-consumer-commission-enforcement-and-compliance-project> 
 
Parker, C. (2004) “Restorative justice in business regulation? The Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission's use of enforceable undertakings”, The 
Modern Law Review, 67(2): 209. 
 
Parker, C, Braithwaite, J and N. Stepanenko (2004) ACCC Enforcement and 
Compliance Project: Working Paper on ACCC Compliance Education & Liaison 
Strategies, Regulatory Institutions Network, online at:  
<http://cccp.anu.edu.au/projects/compliancereportapril2004.pdf> 
 
Sylvan, L. (2004) “Australia’s competition and consumer law: ensuring compliance 
and enforcing the law”, Speech to the Trade Practices & Competition Law 
Conference, Sydney, 16 February 2004, online at: 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=499963&nodeId=ff78498f8c83c
23ea8f7fd4036a4268a&fn=Australias+competition+and+consumer+law+ensuring+co
mpliance+and+enforcing+the+law.pdf> 
Australian	  Securities	  and	  Investment	  Commission	  (ASIC)	  
 
Former ASIC Chairman, Jeffery Lucy, described the Commission’s regulatory 
approach in terms of a tri-partite pyramid. At its base are those who comply with the 
law. For this group, ASIC sees that it’s role is “to provide guidance to help them 
continue to comply.” The middle group contains opportunists who are “prepared to 
bend the rules if they think they can get away with it.” ASIC’s strategy with this band 
is to influence their views and conduct. The peak of the ASIC pyramid consists of 
those who engage in improper and illegal behaviour. ASIC uses its full enforcement 
strength to regulate this group.  
 
ASIC places a strong emphasis on enforcement as the essential component of 
effective regulation. However, it also acknowledges the importance of longer-term 
education and persuasion, in guaranteeing the success of regulatory enforcement. 
 
For more information: 
 
ASIC (2009) “Better Regulation”, online at: 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/betterregulation> 
 
Bird, H., Chow, D., Lenne, J. and I. Ramsay (2003) “Asic Enforcement Patterns”, 
Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation: The University of Melbourne, 
online at: < http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/research-
papers/ASIC%20Enforcement.pdf> 
 
Grant, R. (2005) “ASIC’s regulatory strategy” in Australia’s corporate regulators – 
the ACCC, ASIC and APRA, Research Brief no. 16 2004-05, online at the 
Parliamentary Library of Australia: <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/RB/2004-
05/05rb16.htm#asics> 
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Lucy, J. (2004) “Significant regulatory issues facing ASIC and Australian 
Businesses”, paper delivered to the Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce, 4 August 
2004, (p. 3) online at: 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/AICC_speech_040804.p
df/$file/AICC_speech_040804.pdf> 
 
Australian	  Taxation	  Office	  (ATO)	  
 
The ATO’s regulatory operations are guided by the “Cooperative Compliance Model” 
of self-regulation and voluntary compliance - an acknowledged adaptation of 
Braithwaite and Ayres’ Regulatory Compliance Model. ATO Commissioner Michael 
D’Ascenzo comments, “The Compliance Model helps us understand the causes of 
compliance so that our responses are tailored to the risks.” 
 
The ATO’s approach to compliance is twofold. It seeks to maximise the number of 
taxpayers who choose to voluntarily comply by making it as easy as possible for them 
to understand and meet their tax obligations. But they have also developed strategies 
to deter, detect and address non-compliance. Their Model emphasises the need to 
better understand why people are not complying, and to develop appropriate and 
proportionate responses.  
 
In this vein, the ATO has formulated a tool called the BISEP which is used to analyse 
the taxpayer’s reasons (Business, Industry, Sociological, Economic and 
Psychological), for behaving in a particular way. Understanding reasons for 
compliance enables the ATO to enforce the law while being responsive to the drivers 
of a taxpayer’s non-compliance. By understanding drivers of non-compliance, the 
ATO is better positioned to understand and manage the motivational postures of 
taxpayers and tailor their regulatory intervention accordingly. The ATO Compliance 
Model was first developed by the Cash Economy Task Force (1998) that set out to 
understand and respond to systemic causes of tax non-compliance through cash-
economy activity.  
 
The BISEP tool is based on work conducted by Dr. Valerie Braithwaite which 
describes five main attitudes and responses to compliance. Professor Braithwaite’s 
work on motivational postures has also been used to inform the ATO’s 
conceptualisation of their clients in four main categories: 
1.  disengaged clients who have decided not to comply, 
2.  resistant clients who don’t want to comply, 
3.  captured clients who try to comply, but don’t always succeed, and 
4.  accommodating clients who are willing to do the right thing. 
These categories are listed down the left hand side of the regulatory pyramid with 
their recommended responses on the right: 
 14 
 
The effectiveness of this Compliance Model is evident in its popularity among other 
institutions and organisations, including the New Zealand Inland Revenue Department 
(discussed later), the OECD (see reference below) in its Taxation Approaches, and the 
EU, in their ‘Risk Management Guide for Tax Administrators (p.24) – whose 
compliance pyramid is as follows: 
 
For more information: 
Australian Taxation Office (2000) Cooperative Compliance: Working with Large 
Businesses in the New Tax System, online at: 
<http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/ATOpubs/cooperative%20compliance.pdf> 
 
Australian Taxation Office, Introduction to the compliance model, online at: 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/Content/5704.htm> 
 
Australian Taxation Office, Self-managed superannuation funds-our compliance 
approach, online at: 
<http://www.superannuationnews.com/ATO_Assist/2002-03-04_001_-_nat2065.pdf> 
 
Braithwaite, V. and J. Braithwaite, (2001) “Managing taxation compliance: the 
evolution of the Australian Taxation Office compliance model”, in M. Walpole and C. 
Evans (eds), Tax Administration in the 21st Century, St. Leonards: Prospect Media, 
pp. 215-224, online at: <http://vab.anu.edu.au/pubs/1/managingtaxation.pdf> 
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Braithwaite, V. and J. Job (2003) The theoretical base for the ATO compliance model, 
Centre for Tax System Integrity Research Note, online at: 
<http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/RN5.pdf> 
 
Cash Economy Task Force (1998) Improving Tax Compliance in the Cash Economy, 
Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, online at: 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/SB39073.pdf> 
 
Commonwealth of Australia (1999), House of Representatives Questions on Notice: 
Superannuation: Compulsory Contributions Investigations, Question 504, 13 May 
1999, online at:  
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au:80/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansardr/1999-05-
13/0186/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType%3Dapplication%2Fpdf> 
 
D’Ascenzo, M. (2005) “Compliance: The Right mix of Help and Enforcement: in 
Relationships between Tax administrations and Tax Agents/Taxpayers, presentation 
given to the Asia-Oceania Consultants Association (AOTCA) general meeting, 
Manila 11 November, online at: 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/content/66215.htm> 
 
European Commission Taxation and Customs Union Directorate General (2006) Risk 
Management Guide for Tax Administrations, Brussels, European Commission, online 
at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_cooperation/
gen_overview/Risk_Management_Guide_for_tax_administrations_en.pdf> 
 
Murphy, K. (2004) “Moving towards a more effective model of regulatory 
enforcement in the Australian Taxation Office”, British Tax Review, 6(2004) 603-
619. 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  (2005) Second Meeting of 
the Forum on Tax Administration: Background Note on Meeting’s Discussion 
Themes, 1-2 June, Dublin Castle, Dublin, online at: 
<www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/19/33818656.pdf> 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity Website: <http://ctsi.anu.edu.au> 
 
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) 
  
The ACMA is the sole regulator responsible for overseeing the operation of the ‘Do 
Not Call Scheme’ (DNCS), the ‘Do Not Call Register’ (DNCR) and for investigating 
breaches of the Do Not Call Register Act (2007). The DNCS was established in 
response to community concern about the increase in unsolicited telemarketing calls. 
By joining the Do Not Call Register, individuals are able to list their contact details, 
free of charge, so that they will be excluded from receiving particular telemarketing 
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calls. Any company that calls or arranges for a registered number to be called may be 
in breach of the DNCR Act (2007) and could face penalties.4 
 
The ACMA’s response to breaches by Dodo, an Australian-based telecommunications 
provider, serves as a strong example of the effectiveness of a responsive regulatory 
approach. ACMA commenced formal investigations into Dodo’s operations in 2007 
after receiving over 100 complaints from individuals who had been contacted by 
Dodo despite having been listed on the DNCR for more than the requisite 30 days. 
ACMA sent Dodo an advisory letter, followed by a warning letter detailing 
allegations. Upon commencement of their investigations, ACMA found that Dodo had 
not taken due precaution to inform their contractors and was guilty of breaching the 
Act. Dodo was issued with an infringement notice and fined $147,000 – the largest 
sum paid since the Act’s introduction in early 2007. The issue did not escalate to court 
action, in recognition of Dodo’s cooperation with ACMA’s investigations.  
 
This example highlights how the DNCS provides a simple vehicle through which 
issues can be considered by the register operator and escalated up the regulatory 
pyramid as needed. It also shows how the DNCR and Telecommunications Acts give 
ACMA a wide and flexible range of functions and powers, thereby providing them 
with a strong responsive regulatory framework. Further, the DNCR Act gives ACMA 
the authority to escalate its action until an outcome is achieved and to apply a 
regulatory response proportionate to the degree of non-compliance. Finally, the Dodo 
case-study is a good example of where the ACMA used its powers with strategic 
intent, i.e. it believed it knew where on the regulatory pyramid it ought to direct its 
energy and when to do so to achieve the most optimal result. 
 
For more information: 
ACMA (2009) “Industry self-regulation”, Commonwealth Government, online at: 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_90162> 
 
Crompton, M, Cowper, C and C. Jefferis (2009) “The Australian Dodo Case: an 
insight for data protection regulation”, World Data Protection Report, The Bureau of 
National Affairs, vol. 9, no.1, online at: 
<http://www.iispartners.com/downloads/WDPR%20Dodo%20article%20Jan%20200
9%20EXTRACT%20WDPR0109.pdf> 
 
Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs)  
 
Mills (2008) suggests that the fields of regulation and compliance may have 
something to offer the still developing discipline of corruption prevention: “…both 
are concerned with understanding and promoting ways to increase behaviour that 
conforms to desired standards of conduct and reduce non-complying 
behaviour….both activities employ similar tools to achieve their objectives”. Her 
2008 paper considers whether and how responsive regulation might be applied to the 
work of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs). Drawing on the Australian Quarantine  
and Inspection Service’s (AQIS) enforcement pyramid and Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
                                                
4 https://www.donotcall.gov.au/  
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‘regulatory pyramid’, the paper proposes that ACAs incorporate the following models 
into their regulatory responses: 
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This recognition of the need for a responsive approach is also found in the Attorney 
General’s paper on Australia’s Approach to Fighting Corruption, which specifically 
emphasises the need for the criminal justice system to be “…responsive to changing 
circumstances and….receptive to strategies for improvement.” 
 
For more information 
Attorney General’s Department, “Australia’s Approach to Fighting Corruption”, 
online at: 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341
DBE097801FF)~Qn0000InformationPaperAustraliasApproachtoFightingCorruption.
DOC/$file/Qn0000InformationPaperAustraliasApproachtoFightingCorruption.DOC.> 
 
Mills, A. (2008) “Applying the Enforcement Pyramid to Organisational Corruption 
Prevention”, paper prepared for the Ethics and Integrity of Government Study Group, 
EGPA Conference, Rotterdarm, 3-5 September, online at: 
<http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/A%20Mills%20(Australia)%20Applying%20the%2
0Enforcement%20Pyramid%20to%20Organisational%20Corruption%20Prevention_t
cm31-49079.pdf> 
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Administrative Review Council (ARC) 
 
The ARC’s November 2008 report Administrative Accountability in Business Areas 
Subject to Complex and Specific Regulation, details a pyramid of business rules, 
which differentiates between and suggests the appropriate application of ‘black letter’ 
versus ‘soft’ law. 
 
 
Although the report makes no mention of responsive regulation, the emphasis on 
“soft” law reflects the same model of favouring, at least initially, an “enabling” rather 
than punitive approach to enforcement. 
 
For more information 
Administrative Review Council (2008) Administrative Accountability in Business 
Areas Subject to Complex and Specific Regulation, Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, p.x online at: 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341
DBE097801FF)~d_ARC+Report+No.+49+Complex+Regulation.pdf/$file/d_ARC+R
eport+No.+49+Complex+Regulation.pdf> 
 
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) 
 
According to AQIS’ Compliance and Enforcement Strategy 2002-2003, it will resolve 
issues by “…open and co-operative negotiation, where possible using the ‘regulatory 
pyramid’ approach set out within the Strategy.” Their regulatory pyramid is laid out 
below. AQIS also states that it “…places its regulatory focus at the lower end of the 
pyramid to achieve an efficient delivery of its service.” 
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For more information 
Australian Customs Service (2005) “Application of Enforcement Powers in Respect 
to the Quarantine Act 1908 and the Customs Act 1901 Arising from the Operation of 
the International Trade Modernisation Legislation (ITML)”, Australian Government, 
online at: <www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/134202/cn_05-02.pdf> 
 
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) & Australian Customs Service 
(2007) “Guidelines on Enforcement Powers in Respect to Offence Provisions under 
the Customs Act 1901 and Compliance Agreements under the Quarantine Act 1908”, 
Australian Government, online at: 
<http://www.aqis.gov.au/icon32/asp/ex_topiccontent.asp?TopicType=Quarantine+Al
ert&TopicID=7500> 
 
Mills, A. (2008) “Applying the Enforcement Pyramid to Organisational Corruption 
Prevention”, paper prepared for the Ethics and Integrity of Government Study Group, 
EGPA Conference, Rotterdarm, 3-5 September, online at: 
<http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/A%20Mills%20(Australia)%20Applying%20the%2
0Enforcement%20Pyramid%20to%20Organisational%20Corruption%20Prevention_t
cm31-49079.pdf> 
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The NSW Government’s ‘Better Regulation Office’ 
 
The Better Regulation Office has developed a Guide to Better Regulation. Their 
approach is thin on responsiveness and does not use a pyramid approach to escalate or 
de-escalate, but it does make the important point that options for achieving 
compliance involve non-regulatory approaches that should be tried or considered first: 
 
“If it has been determined that there is a need for government action, the starting 
point should be a non-regulatory approach. Some policy problems may be more 
efficiently or effectively addressed by the market or by individuals acting without 
government involvement. Non-regulatory approaches are options to deal with a 
policy problem that do not involve government intervention to direct the actions of 
people or organisations. It is important to consider non-regulatory options because 
these often have lower costs and less impact on markets than regulatory options. 
Stakeholders should be consulted to help determine whether a non-regulatory 
approach might be appropriate in a given situation. Types of non-regulatory 
approaches include: provision of information, self-regulation, quasi-regulation, and 
co-regulation.” 
 
According to their website, the Better Regulation Office was established as a means 
of ensuring that regulations are effective in achieving their objectives and do not 
impose unnecessary burdens on business and the community. This initiative is part of 
the NSW Government’s commitment to cut red tape, which in turn forms part of its 
‘investing in a better future’ plan. 
 
The NSW government has articulated what characterises good regulation in their 
Guide to Better Regulation, and more specifically through the following seven Better 
Regulation principles (which are outlined in the Guide): 
Principle 1: The need for government action should be established 
Principle 2: The objective of government action should be clear 
Principle 3: The impact of government action should be properly understood by 
considering the costs and benefits of a range of options, including non-regulatory 
options 
Principle 4: Government action should be effective and proportional 
Principle 5: Consultation with business and the community should inform regulatory 
development 
Principle 6: The simplification, repeal, reform or consolidation of existing regulation 
should be considered 
Principle 7: Regulation should be periodically reviewed, and if necessary reformed to 
ensure its continued efficiency and effectiveness 
 
The Guide to Better Regulation assists agencies to develop regulation which is 
“required, reasonable and responsive”, by providing details on how to apply the 
above principles.  
 
For more information: 
Better Regulation Office (2009) “Better Regulation Requirements”, Department of 
Premier and Cabinet, NSW Government, online at: 
<http://www.betterregulation.nsw.gov.au/better_regulation_requirements> 
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Better Regulation Office (2009) “Guide to Better Regulation”, Department of Premier 
and Cabinet, NSW Government, online at: 
<http://www.betterregulation.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/16848/01_Bette
r_Regulation_eGuide_October_2009.pdf> 
 
Better Regulation Office (2009) “The Better Regulation Office”, Department of 
Premier and Cabinet, NSW Government, online at: 
<http://www.betterregulation.nsw.gov.au/> 
 
Office of Transport Security (OTS) 
 
The OTS states that their 
regulatory approach is: 
“…to ensure industry compliance 
with the law and regulations by 
effecting changes in industry 
participant behaviour towards 
their regulatory obligations.” 
 
To further these objectives, the 
Office’s regulatory activities are 
guided by a responsive regulation 
pyramid, which lists a continuum 
of motivational postures and their 
necessary responses, but which 
focuses greatest attention on 
achieving compliance through the 
lower levels of awareness building 
and education.  
 
For more information 
 
Office of Transport Security (2008) Our Regulatory Philosophy, Department of 
Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, online at 
<http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/pdf/OTS_Regulatory_Philosoph
y.pdf> 
 
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 
 
Family	  Group	  Conferencing	  
 
The popularity and success of Family Group Conferencing, since its inception in the 
late 80s, serves as a testament to the effectiveness of responsive regulatory 
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approaches that embrace restorative justice. Not all conferencing programs are located 
within a responsive framework, yet in many countries they are. 
 
As Adams writes, “family group conferencing (FGC) brings to the project of child 
protection a form of restorative justice within a framework of responsive regulation.” 
 
Family group conferences were first legislated as the standard for child and family 
decision making in New Zealand in 1989 and since that time have experienced 
widespread and international adoption among professionals and academics (Harris 
2008). Australia, in particular, has seen a steady embrace of FGC since it was first 
introduced in 1992 by a Victorian NGO. The programs or variations on them are now 
used in all jurisdictions except the Northern Territory. 
 
For more information: 
 
Adams, Paul and Susan Chandler (2004) “Responsive Regulation in Child Welfare: 
Systemic Challenges to Mainstreaming the Family Group Conference”, Journal of 
Sociology & Social Welfare, 31(1) 93–116.  
 
Harris, N. (2008) “Family group conferencing in Australia 15 years on”, Child Abuse 
Prevention Issues, vol. 27, online at: 
<http://www.aifs.gov.au/nch/pubs/issues/issues27/issues27.html> 
 
Huntsman, L. (2006) “Family group conferencing in a child welfare context – a 
review of the literature”, NSW Department of Community Services, online at: 
<http://www.community.nsw.gov.au/docswr/_assets/main/documents/research_famil
y_conferencing.pdf> (esp. p.17: “A systemic approach to FGC”) 
 
Merkel-Holguin, L. (2004) “Sharing Power with the People: Family Group 
Conferencing as a Democratic Experiment”, Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, 
31(1) 155-173. 
 
Mirsky, L. (2003) “Family Group Conferencing Worldwide”, International Institute 
for Restorative Practices, online at:  
Part 1: <http://www.iirp.org/library/fgcseries01.html> 
Part 2: <http://www.iirp.org/library/fgcseries02.html>  
Part 3: <http://www.iirp.org/library/fgcseries03.html> 
 
Pennell, J. (2004), “Family Group Conferencing in Child Welfare: Responsive and 
Regulatory Interfaces”, Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 31(1) 117-135, 
online at: 
<http://www.olc.edu/~jolson/433/Family%20Group%20Conferencing%20in%20Chil
d%20Welfare--%20Responsive%20and%20Regulatory%20Interfaces..pdf> 
 
Trotter, C., Sheehan, R., Liddell, M., Strong, D. and C. Laragy (1999), “Evaluation of 
the Statewide Implementation of Family Group Conferencing”, Protection and Care, 
Youth and Family Services, Victorian Department of Human Services, online at: 
<http://www.varj.asn.au/pdf/99%20FGC%20Eval%20Vic.pdf> 
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Office	  for	  Children,	  Youth	  and	  Family	  Support5:	  Children’s	  Policy	  and	  
Regulation	  Unit	  (CPRU)	  
 
According to their Compliance Strategy (2009), the CPRU ensures compliance is 
achieved is “through the practice of responsive regulation.” This means that in the 
first instance, the Office supports Children’s Services to develop their own effective 
responses rather than stipulating what they must do. However, in the event that this 
fails, the CPRU may immediately escalate its approach by utilising statutory means to 
elicit compliance.  This may be through issuing a Compliance Notice, Suspension, or 
Safety Suspension. 
 
The CPRU describes its regulatory approach as: “collaborative, strengths-based and 
child centred.” It seeks to “ensure services feel empowered to meet their minimum 
requirements and understand the need for the requirements to exist,” noting that 
“Highly developed relationships enable regulators to work proactively to achieve 
compliance.” 
 
According to the CPRU (2009), when noncompliance is identified, Children’s 
Services Advisers utilise Braithwaite and Ayres’ Responsive Regulation Model along 
with their own adapted version of this pyramid, called the CPRU Practice Model. 
This latter model outlines the array of responses available to assist services to address 
noncompliance (see next page).  
 
For more information 
Office for Children, Youth and Family Support (2009) “Compliance Strategy”, 
Children’s Policy and Regulation Unit, Department of Disability, Housing and 
Community Services, online at: 
<http://www.dhcs.act.gov.au/__data/assets/word_doc/0005/49829/CPRU_Complianc
e_Strategy_-_January_2009.doc> 
                                                
5 An office of the Department of Disability, Housing and Community Services, ACT Government 
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Further	  information	  on	  responsive	  approaches	  to	  child	  protection:	  
 
Allen Consulting Group (2008) “Inverting the pyramid: enhancing systems for 
protecting children”, Australian Research Alliance for Children & Youth, online at: 
<http://www.aracy.org.au/cmsdocuments/REP_Inverting_the_Pyramid_Enhancing_S
ystems_for_Protecting_Children_2009.pdf> 
 
Connolly, Marie (2009) “Professional Responses: Who Does What in Domestic 
Violence and Child Protection?”, Communities, Children and Families Australia, 4(1) 
36-39.  
 
Harries, Maria (2009) “The Downside of Regulation and the Opportunities for Public 
Engagement about the Care and Protection of Children”, Communities, Children and 
Families Australia, 4(1) 47-51. 
 
Parton, Nigel (2009) “How Child Centred are Our Child Protection Systems and How 
Child Centred Do We Want our Child Protection Regulatory Principles To Be?”, 
Communities, Children and Families Australia, 4(1) 59-64. 
 
Scott, Dorothy (2009) “Regulatory Principles and Reforming Possibilities in Child 
Protection: What Might be in the Best Interests of Children?”, Communities, Children 
and Families Australia, 4(1) 65-70. 
 
The Community Partnerships for Protecting Children initiative in the US:  
<http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/cppc/> 
 
The Every Child Matters reforms in the UK: 
<http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/everychildmatters/> 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
South	  Australian	  Environment	  Protection	  Agency	  (EPA)	  
The following mission statement from the South Australian EPA highlights a degree 
of responsiveness in their approach to ensuring compliance: 
“The powers and duties given to the EPA by the environmental legislation we 
administer are significant. They include a variety of tools to ensure that all 
reasonable and practicable measures are taken to protect, restore and enhance the 
quality of the environment. Much of this is achieved through providing advice and 
guidance, partnering with other organisations, education and regulation. However, in 
some circumstances, we will use our enforcement powers. Our aim is that the 
balanced and principled use of compliance and enforcement tools will ensure that our 
actions are consistent, fair and effective, and will provide assurance to the community 
that the EPA is working to fulfill its role of protecting the environment.” 
This responsiveness to the conduct, culture and context of the regulatee is reflected in 
the following factors and principles, which are taken into account when the Authority 
determines what compliance and enforcement action to take: 
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• the seriousness of the contravention, for example the nature and extent of the 
impact, harm or potential harm to the environment or the potential to undermine the 
regulatory regime and 
• the extent and speed of remedial action required 
• the compliance history 
• the alleged offender’s willingness to cooperate as evidenced by factors including 
remediation action taken or 
offered, and whether the offender brought the incident to the attention of the EPA. 
 
5 Principles for compliance and enforcement decisions: 
 
1. Proportional  
2. Consistent 
3. Transparent 
4. Targeted 
5. Timely 
 
In their report, “Compliance and enforcement regulatory options and tools”, the EPA 
presents a series of diagrams, similar to the regulatory pyramid, which detail the 
sequence that different levels of escalation ought to follow for a particular scenario, 
e.g.: 
 
 
For more information: 
Environment Protection Authority (2009) “Compliance and enforcement regulatory 
options and tools”, South Australian Government, online at: 
<http://www.epa.sa.gov.au/xstd_files/Licensing/Guideline/cem.pdf> 
 
Environmental Protection Authority (2009) “What we do: compliance & enforcement 
statement”, South Australian Government, online at: 
<http://www.epa.sa.gov.au/what_we_do/compliance_and_enforcement_statement> 
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PRIVACY 
 
Australian	  Privacy	  Foundation	  
 
The Australian Privacy Foundation is the peak non-governmental organisation 
dedicated to upholding the privacy rights of Australians. The Foundation uses the 
Australian Privacy Charter as a benchmark against which laws, regulations and 
privacy invasive initiatives can be assessed. The following quote summarises well the 
Foundation’s approach to regulation:  
 
“…we caution against the often asserted (by industry) assumption that provided 
consumers are given enough information, they can be left to make their own choices 
free of ‘heavy handed’ regulation. Our extensive experience leads us to the 
conclusion that there can never be an effective ‘free market’ in relation to some 
important issues and that some industry practices are simply not acceptable. We have 
no ideological commitment to regulation for its own sakes but neither do we accept 
that it is inherently undesirable and to be minimised. There should be ‘as much 
regulation as necessary, but no more than is required’ to deliver agreed policy 
outcomes.” 
 
As stated in a recent submission, the Foundation “strongly” supports a “…‘responsive 
regulation’ model that includes all levels from education and awareness activity, 
through conciliation and mediation of complaints and compliance monitoring to 
vigorous proactive enforcement activity by regulators to address serious or repeated 
non-compliance and systemic failures.” 
 
For more information: 
Australian Privacy Foundation, online at: <http://www.privacy.org.au/> 
 
Australian Privacy Foundation (2009), “Campaigning for consumers in 
communications: a consultation”, Submission to the Australian Communications 
Consumer Action Network, online at: <http://www.privacy.org.au/Papers/ACCAN-
0910.pdf> 
 
The	  Privacy	  Act	  
 
The principles of responsive regulation were endorsed under former Privacy 
Commissioner Malcolm Crompton (1999-2004). There have been criticisms more 
recently, however, over implementation of a responsive regulatory approach with too 
much emphasis on activity at the bottom of the pyramid and neglect of the top. 
 
In fact, Greenleaf et al (2007) argue that the OPC is “a failure at implementing 
responsive regulation” and that “the apex of its pyramid of enforcement has lost 
credibility because it simply does not use it.” They cite the fact that the Commissioner 
has never sought or even threatened to obtain an injunction, thereby surrendering its 
effectiveness as a tool in the upper levels of the regulatory pyramid. They also cite 
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Braithwaite’s comment that “one test of responsive regulation is how good a system it 
is in ‘bubbling up’ stories of its successes and failures”, pointing out that no such 
stories have been published in the life of the Commissioner. Based on these 
observations, Greenleaf et al, in their submission to the Australian Law Reform 
Commission’s (ALRC) 2007 review of the Privacy Act, state that any reforms to the 
Privacy Act must improve their responsiveness as regulators, lest they be a waste of 
time. The Australian Privacy Foundation, among others, agrees with this conclusion.  
 
For more information 
Australian Privacy Foundation (2009) “Digital Economy Future Directions: 
Consultation Draft Paper”, submission to the Department of Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy, online at: 
<http://www.privacy.org.au/Papers/DBCDE-DigEcon-0902.pdf> 
 
Greenleaf, G, Waters, N. and L. Bygrave (2007) “Implementing Privacy Principles: 
After 20 Years, It’s Time to Enforce the Privacy Act”, online at: 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/2007/31.html#fnB82> 
 
Waters, N. and G. Greenleaf (2008) “Meeting Privacy Challenges – the ALRC and 
NSLRC Privacy Reviews”, Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre, online at: 
<http://www.bakercyberlawcentre.org/ipp/events/symposium08/materials/2_Waters_
Paper.pdf> 
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INTERNATIONAL	  EXAMPLES	  
 
BRITAIN 
The	  Hampton	  Review	  (2005):	  “Reducing	  Administrative	  Burdens:	  Effective	  
Inspection	  and	  Enforcement”	  	  
 
The Hampton Review led to the creation of the Better Regulation Executive, which 
aims to reduce administrative burdens on business whilst still holding government 
departments and regulators to account. (Lord 2009). The Review also led to the 
creation of the Regulators Compliance Code (2007).  
 
In the his Executive Summary, Hampton acknowledged the positive components of 
the UK government’s existing regulatory system but highlighted 6 problem areas, 2 of 
which are especially relevant to the field of responsive regulation:  
• regulators lack effective tools6 to punish persistent offenders and reward 
compliant behaviour by business; 
• the structure of regulations, particularly at [a] local level, is complex, 
prevents joining up, and discourages business-responsive behaviour; 
 
Hampton promoted New Zealand’s Workplace Health and Safety Strategy, which 
makes reference to regulatory approaches which embrace responsiveness and which 
address motivational posturing in their compliance-building strategies: 
“…we need to ensure that regulators use a flexible approach to intervention, 
depending on the motivations and responses of individual employers.” (p.26) 
 
Further, the Review acknowledged that the gradual adoption of more responsive 
regulation has led to a general acceptance among business and regulators that 
inspections are inefficient in low-risk/high performing businesses and that risk 
assessments should instead inform the work programmes of inspectorates. It cites 
documents such as the Environment Agency’s Delivering for the environment, and the 
Health and Safety Commission’s A strategy for workplace health and safety to 2010 
and beyond as examples of where the case for a more risk-based approach has been 
strongly made (p.27). The Review recommends that all regulatory agencies should 
adopt such an approach, on grounds that it provides an effective framework which 
enables regulators to relate their enforcement activities to the achievement of 
objectives, it ensures resources are targeted in a manner that prioritises the highest 
risks and it helps to evaluate new regulatory challenges and risks. 
 
For more information: 
Baldwin, R and J. Black (2008) “Really Responsive Regulation”, The Modern Law 
Review, 71(1) 59-94, online at: < http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/fulltext/119394476/PDFSTART> 
 
                                                
6 i.e. insufficient levels in the regulatory pyramid 
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Better Regulation Executive (2007) “Regulators’ Compliance Code: Statutory Code 
of Practice for Regulators”, Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory 
Reform, online at: <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file45019.pdf>  
 
Hampton, P. (2005) “Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and 
enforcement”, HM Treasury, online at: <www.berr.gov.uk/files/file22988.pdf> 
 
Lord, V. (2009) “The Hampton and Macrory Reviews: A Summary”, The Kingsley 
Napley Regulatory Law Update, online at: 
<http://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/assets/files/newsletters/2229v06_KN_Regulator_
AUGHR%20(2).pdf> 
 
Better Regulation Executive (2006) “Regulatory Justice: Sanctioning in a post-
Hampton World”, London: Cabinet Office, <www.berr.gov.uk/files/file45183.pdf> 
 
The	  Macrory	  Review	  (2006):	  “Regulatory	  Justice:	  Making	  Sanctions	  
Effective”	  
 
The Hampton Review recommended that the Better Regulation Executive (BRE) 
should undertake a comprehensive review of regulators’ penalty regimes. 
Accordingly, the BRE established a Penalties Review, under the guidance of 
Professor Richard Macrory. The Penalties Review findings were the basis for the 
recommendations outlined in the Macrory Review (BRE 2006). It should also be 
mentioned that this review forms part of a wider government agenda on improving 
regulation, which includes the implementation of the aforementioned Hampton 
recommendations and the work of the Better Regulation Task Force as outlined in 
their 2005 report – “Regulation – Less is More: Reducing Burdens, Improving 
Outcomes.” 
 
The Macrory Review outlines strategies for improving compliance among UK 
businesses. The recommendations call for an increase in the number and variety of 
sanctions, below that of criminal prosecution, as a means of enabling regulators to 
deal effectively with non-compliance in cases where criminal prosecution is not 
warranted. This multi-tiered approach is grounded in an overall strategy, referred to 
numerously by Macrory, to improve the responsiveness of the regulatory system. 
Macrory also recommends that pilot schemes to promote restorative justice for 
regulatory non-compliance be established. The Macrory Recommendations 
subsequently helped form the basis of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act, 
Part 3 - which is discussed after this section (Lord 2009) 
 
Macrory concludes his review with the following remarks: 
“The reforms suggested by this review are not intended to transform sanctioning 
systems overnight, but to bring into them the flexibility, efficiencies and 
responsiveness that can facilitate the full implementation of the Hampton agenda. 
This will result in better deterrence options for regulators, better compliance for 
business and better outcomes for the public.” (p.9) 
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“These proposals are not about making it easier to penalise businesses but to create a 
system of sanctions that is more responsive and proportionate to the nature of the 
non-compliance.”(p.47) 
 
Principle 3 of his recommendations is to pursue ‘Responsive Sanctioning’, that is: 
“A sanction should be responsive and consider what is appropriate for the 
particular offender and the regulatory issue, which can include punishment and 
the public stigma that should be associated with a criminal conviction.” (p.30) 
 
Under his section on ‘The Role and Importance of Sanctions within the Regulatory 
System’, Macrory discusses the “limited range of enforcement tools” available to 
regulators: 
 “Over the course of my review, I have received evidence and submissions from many 
stakeholders including regulators, businesses, academics and many others that have 
supported my view that regulators have a limited range of enforcement sanctions 
within their toolkits.” (p.17)  
 
This is a view shared by the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: 
“DEFRA supports the widely held view, espoused also in Hampton, that the current 
system is not sufficiently responsive, targeted and sensitive to ensure that appropriate 
penalties are applied in all cases. To this end, the department accepts that there is 
room for improvement but restates its basic tenet that a robust penalties framework 
should encompass different types and levels of sanctions depending on the nature, 
frequency and seriousness of non-compliance.” (p.18)  
 
Macrory also discusses why a greater number of enforcement tools and compliance 
strategies is necessary: 
 “Criminal prosecutions remain the primary formal sanction available to most 
regulators. While this sanction is appropriate in many cases, the time, expense, moral 
condemnation and criminal record involved may not be appropriate for all breaches 
of regulatory obligations and is burdensome to both the regulator and business. While 
the most serious offences merit criminal prosecution, it may not be an appropriate 
route in achieving a change in behaviour and improving outcomes for a large number 
of businesses where the non-compliance is not truly criminal in its intention.” (p.18) 
 
For more information 
Better Regulation Executive (2006) “Regulatory Justice: Sanctioning in a post-
Hampton World”, London: Cabinet Office, online at:  
< http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file45183.pdf> 
 
Better Regulation Taskforce (2005) “Regulation – Less is More: Reducing Burdens, 
Improving Outcomes”, a Report to the Prime Minister: Executive Summary` , online 
at: 
<http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/brc/upload/assets/www.brc.gov.uk/lessismore_ex
ec_summary.pdf> 
 
Department for Business Innovation & Skills (BIS) “Improving Compliance among 
Businesses (Macrory Review)”, online at: 
<http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/reviewing-regulation/compliance-
businesses/page44102.html> 
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Lord, V. (2009) “The Hampton and Macrory Reviews: A Summary”, The Kingsley 
Napley Regulatory Law Update, online at: 
<http://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/assets/files/newsletters/2229v06_KN_Regulator_
AUGHR%20(2).pdf> 
 
Macrory, R. (2006) “Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective”, London: 
Cabinet Office, online at: <www.berr.gov.uk/files/file44593.pdf> 
 
The	  UK	  Office	  of	  Communications	  (Ofcom)	  
 
Ofcom states that it aims to be “as transparent and objective as possible” when 
selecting the most appropriate regulatory approach. It has developed a “continuum of 
approaches” from, “no regulation at all, through industry self-regulation, co-
regulation, to full statutory intervention,” stating that “no one form of regulation can 
successfully regulate all the various types of behaviour and activities going on within 
the communications sector.” It is their preference to “work in partnership with 
stakeholders to develop regulation,” recognising that “self- and co- regulation can, in 
the right circumstances, provide an effective means to address citizens’ and 
consumers’ interests.” They also highlight that: “the fast moving and technologically 
complex nature of the communications markets can…under some circumstances, 
make statutory regulation insufficiently flexible.” 
In applying their regulatory principles, Ofcom seeks to “adopt a pragmatic and 
flexible approach…and take additional factors into account as appropriate to a 
specific case.” Finally, it is their policy to “consult publicly on any proposals for 
changes in regulation….and…include impact assessments of different options in 
[their] consultations,” all of which, when applied, are elements of regulatory 
responsiveness.  
 
For more information: 
Ofcom (2008) “Initial assessments of when to adopt self- or co- regulation”, 
Consultation Paper, online at: 
<http://www.itu.int/ituweblogs/treg/content/binary/condoc.pdf> 
 
Ofcom, “Identifying appropriate regulatory solutions: principles for analysing self- 
and co-regulation: Executive Summary”, online at: 
<http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/coregulation/statement/> 
 
The	  Regulatory	  Enforcement	  &	  Sanctions	  Act	  (RESA)	  2008	  
 
As a result of the Macrory recommendations, Part 3 of the RESA provides regulators 
with new civil sanctioning powers to complement the existing criminal sanctions, as a 
means of better enforcing compliance across regulated businesses. It aims to provide 
“flexibility to regulators when dealing with businesses whose conduct falls short of 
the standards required of them. The range of sanctions gives regulators the ability to 
respond on a case by case basis, allowing the application of appropriate sanctions for 
minor breaches, whilst retaining the ability to prosecute major breaches in the 
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criminal courts.” In this way, the Act is an example of where the regulatory pyramid 
has been expanded to include a wider range of enforcement and compliance tools.  
 
For more information: 
Hill, N. (2009) “RESA 2008: An overview of Part 3”, The Kingsley Napley 
Regulatory Law Update, online at: 
<http://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/assets/files/newsletters/2229v06_KN_Regulator_
AUGHR%20(2).pdf> 
 
CANADA 
Ontario	  Securities	  Commission	  (OSC)	  
 
The OSC is the largest securities regulator in Canada, with a vision statement as 
follows: 
“To be an effective and responsive securities regulator – fostering a culture of 
integrity and compliance and instilling investor confidence in the capital markets.” 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/static/_/AnnualReports/2009/chair_mesg.html 
 
In their 2008 report, the need to "identify the important issues and deal with them in a 
timely way" is expressed clearly under "Goal 1: Responsive regulation." According to 
Marquis: “the mention of "responsive regulation" in this section of the report may be 
coincidental, but the language contained within it--proportionate and timely reaction 
to industry behaviour, possession of a range of tools-- appears to conform with Ayres 
and Braithwaite's model of responsive regulation.” 
 
Based on study of the OSC’s regulatory responses, Marquis proposes the following 
regulatory pyramid as a model for their operations: 
 
 
Recent analysis of the Commission's enforcement activity suggests that it conforms 
closely to the “enforcement pyramid" model (Marquis, 2009). Severe sanctions are 
used only very occasionally while intermediate sanctions occupy a larger scope of 
OSC's activity. According to OSC Chair David Wilson, the majority of the OSC’s 
activity is concentrated at the pyramid’s base, that is, it focuses on persuasion and 
"softer" means of securing compliance. 
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The Commission has a wide range of enforcement tools (including license revocation, 
officer bans, cease trading orders, onerous reporting requirements and various civil 
and criminal sanctions) at its disposal. However, it seldom uses its higher-level 
enforcement tools, thereby attenuating its reputation and rendering ineffective its 
capacity to responsively escalate sanctions in the event of non-compliance.  
 
As Marquis (2009) puts it: “It has been observed, in a number of cases, that the OSC 
has failed to successfully apply serious sanctions to big (and very public) offenders. 
We can safely assume that the regulated players within the Commission's jurisdiction 
understand this history, including the particular political and legal dynamics the 
regulator operates in.” 
 
For more info: 
Marquis, K. (2009) “Responsive Securities Regulation: An Assessment of the 
Enforcement Practices of the Ontario Securities Commission”, Regulatory 
Governance Initiative Working Paper, Ottawa, ON: Carleton University, online at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1532366> 
 
Ontario Securities Commission, “2008 Annual Report: Goal 1 Responsive 
Regulation”, online at: 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/static/_/AnnualReports/2008/goal1.html> 
 
Nova	  Scotia’s	  Environmental	  Compliance	  Model	  
 
According to the Nova Scotia Department of Environment and Labour, their 
Environment Act and its regulations are aimed at achieving a: “responsive, effective, 
fair, timely and efficient administrative and regulatory system” to protect the 
environment.  
 
Reflecting elements of the Regulatory Pyramid, their monitoring and compliance 
division embraces 3 core principles – education, inspection and enforcement. In 2002, 
the department’s compliance model was improved to include a greater emphasis on 
cooperative/self- regulation, e.g.  
• delivering an education program to help the public and businesses comply with all 
environmental laws more easily. 
• creating a Web-based plain-language guide to compliance and enforcement under 
the Environment Act 
• formulating an operational policy guide that gives inspectors a clear description of 
the tools available to them, including non-punitive or voluntary means, to promote 
compliance with the law. 
 
These changes are part of a government-wide “better regulation” initiative which is 
being pursued in the form of a “Regulatory Management Policy”. The policy is aimed 
at achieving enforcement by operating predominantly at the base of the regulatory 
pyramid (i.e. education and persuasion) but also ensuring that regulators know when 
and how to escalate their approach if necessary. 
 
According to the government, the “essence” of this policy is to: 
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• consider carefully when to intervene, 
• do it only when the benefits justify the costs, 
• leave a light footprint when it does get involved, and 
• ensure the benefits and protection of regulation are maintained or improved. 
 
They also highlight the importance of education in any effective regulatory approach:  
“It's not enough to create - or even communicate - a new policy. As with any new 
regulation, the regulator has a responsibility to ensure those affected are aware and 
understand what it means to them. That's why [our] policy is supported by training 
and a plain language guide with more information on implementing it.” 
 
For more information:  
 
Government of Nova Scotia: 
“Better Regulation: Competitiveness and Compliance Initiative Strategy” (CCI), 
online at: <http://www.gov.ns.ca/nse/cci/> 
“Nova Scotia Environment and Labour’s Competitiveness and Compliance Initiative 
Strategy: 2005/06 – 2009/10”, online at: 
<http://gov.ns.ca/betterregulation/pdf/StrategyFINLoRes.pdf> 
“Improving Regulatory Quality”, online at 
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/betterregulation/action/improving.html> 
“Regulatory Management Policy Guide”, online at:   
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/betterregulation/pdf/Reg-Mgmt-Policy-Guide-PDF.pdf> 
 
Nova Scotia Department of Environment and Labour: 
“The Environmental Compliance Model”, online at:  
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/nse/cci/docs/CCIEMCFactsheet.pdf> 
 
Further information about Canada and Responsive Regulation 
 
Treasury Board of Canada (1993) "Responsive regulation in Canada”, presented to 
the Sub-committee on Regulations and Competitiveness, Standing Committee on 
Finance, House of Commons, Ottawa: Government of Canada. 
INDONESIA 
Indonesian	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  
 
The Ministry emphasises the importance of building voluntary compliance in 
taxpayers. In this vein, their Offices, through education programs, help taxpayers 
understand their rights and obligations under the tax laws. They stress the importance 
of balancing service and enforcement but acknowledge that regulation must be 
responsive and as such the service-enforcement balance will fluctuate in response to 
the inevitable differences in risk profiles presented by taxpayers. 
The Ministry’s Compliance Strategy also reflects elements of responsiveness, in that 
they seek to first build compliance at the bottom levels of the regulatory pyramid 
(Pakpahan). Their strategy includes the following: 
• Provide a wide range of informative tax publications and campaigns 
• Conduct various active tax education programs  
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• Make early contact with taxpayers who have failed to submit returns or pay 
tax 
• Introduce improved risk analysis across the region  
• Work on non-lodgement returns and trace taxpayers with whom contact has 
been lost 
• To ensure correct disclosure, crosscheck third party information with our 
database 
• Build closer relationships through industry associations and tax professionals 
and agents 
 
For more information 
Pakpahan, R. “Tax Administration Strategies to Respond to Small and Medium 
Enterprises: Case of Indonesia”, Ministry of Finance, the Republic of Indonesia, 
online at: 
<http://www.itdweb.org/SMEconference/documents/parallel/1B%20Pakpahan%20IN
DONESIA%20ppt%20ENG.pdf> 
 
NEW ZEALAND 
 
New	  Zealand	  Advertising	  Standards	  Authority	  
 
The guiding philosophy of the New Zealand Advertising Standards Authority is self-
regulation (ANZA 2008). 
 
According to the Association of New Zealand Advertisers (2008): 
“The ASA regime is a good example of Responsive Regulation in action. A good aim 
for regulation is to achieve the desired regulatory response in the most cost effective, 
timely and efficient manner. The theory of Responsive Regulation, as devised by Ayres 
and Braithwaite…is based on the premise that “persuasion is cheap and punishment 
is expensive.” The ASA regime uses persuasion techniques in a very sophisticated 
manner to achieve a cost-effective, timely and efficient regulatory regime which 
protects and empowers consumers.” 
 
And Harker et al (2005) state that…  
“…[The ASA] system of advertising self-regulation has evolved in line with the 
‘responsive regulation philosophy provided so articulately by Ayres and 
Braithwaite… the ASA regulators certainly persuade rather than punish overtly… a 
soft, consultative tone is used to achieve compliance; this is a method of regulation to 
which industry responds favourably and thus other stakeholders also achieve their 
objectives. So, enforcement of decisions, which is paramount to the success of any 
regulatory scheme, is achieved at the ASA with a big stick used sparingly and 
quietly.”  
 
According to ASA, it has chosen the self/responsive-regulatory approach for the 
following reasons: 
• “Self-regulation can operate much faster than other forms of regulation”  - 
up to 3 times faster, according to research conducted by the Foundation for 
Advertising Research (FAR) 
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• Use of the ‘balance of probabilities’ rather than ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ approach (as in the prosecution system) means there is a lower 
threshold of proof required to uphold a complaint and therefore greater 
pressure on advertisers to comply under a self-regulatory system 
• “A substantial benefit of self-regulation is its flexibility, which enables it 
to respond quickly to changed circumstances.” 
• The advertising codes include an obligation to “observe a high standard of 
social responsibility” when advertising to children. This could not be 
enacted in law, which requires greater precision than a self-regulatory 
code. 
• Self-regulation allows for greater government monitoring and constructive 
information exchange 
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For more information: 
 
ANZA (2008) A Guide to Self-Regulation of Advertising in New Zealand, online at: 
<http://www.anza.co.nz/files/anza/Guide%20to%20Self%20Regulation%20of%20Ad
vertising%20in%20NZ_0.pdf> 
 
Harker, D., Wiggs, G. and M. Harker (2005) “Responsive Advertising Regulation: A 
Study from New Zealand”, Australian Journal of Political Science, 40(4): 1-14, 
online at: <http://www.ffar.org/PDFS/AJPS%20CAJP130227.pdf> 
 
New	  Zealand	  Inland	  Revenue	  Department	  
 
According to Morris and Lonsdale (2005), Inland Revenue has developed a 
compliance model to: 
“...assist in understanding the factors that influence taxpayer compliance behaviour, 
while enabling it to choose the most appropriate actions to achieve long-term 
compliance.” 
 
The department acknowledges that their compliance model is: 
 “…based on a concept developed by the Australian National University and refined 
for the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). Similar models are used in other tax 
administrations. The model is a tool that helps us achieve the outcomes outlined in 
Inland Revenue’s Business Plan—The Way Forward.” 
 
Their compliance model is illustrated in a pyramid (the same as that of the ATO) 
which has two components:  
1) focusing on the customer’s attitudes and behaviours  
2) focusing on the department’s response as a means of achieving compliance 
 
 
Figure A: Components of the Compliance Model 
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Figure B: Using the Compliance Model 
 
The department’s compliance model also includes an expanded version of the BISEP. 
Mentioned earlier under the ATO section, this is a tool for analysing the customer’s 
reasons for behaving in a particular way. 
 
 
For more information: 
Copeland, V. (2005) “Research into the Impact of Audit on Compliance”, in Recent 
Research on Tax Administration and Compliance, proceedings of the 2005 IRS 
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Research Conference, Washington, June 7-8, online at: <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/05copeland.pdf> 
 
Morris, T. and M. Lonsdale (2005) Translating the Compliance Model into Practical 
Reality, New Zealand Inland Revenue, online at: <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/04moori.pdf> 
 
New	  Zealand	  Liquor	  Sales	  
 
In 1998, the Alcohol and Public Health Research Unit (APHRU), funded by the New 
Zealand Health Research Council completed an investigation into the application of 
‘responsive regulation’ theory to the Sale of Liquor Act 1989. The investigation’s 
findings prompted a series of recommendations, which contributed to the review and 
amendment of the Act. 
 
In particular, it was recommended that responsive regulatory strategies be applied to 
the following aspects of the Act: 
• the criteria and conditions under which each licence is granted,  
• the right of objection by members of public to the grant or renewal of a 
licence, and  
• the Liquor Licensing Authority’s powers of sanction.  
 
According to the APHRU: 
“The theoretical work [of Braithwaite and Ayres] and the example of its application 
to liquor licensing has significance for other areas of public health concern which are 
regulated through legislation.” 
 
For more information: 
Hill, L. and L. Stewart (1998) “Responsive Regulation & the Sale of Liquor in NZ”, 
Alcohol & Public Health Research Unit, online at: 
<http://www.aphru.ac.nz/projects/responsive.htm> 
 
Hill, L. & L. Stewart (1998) "Responsive Regulation": Theory and the Sale of Liquor 
Act, Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, 11, 49-65 
 
New	  Zealand	  Ministry	  of	  Consumer	  Affairs	  (MCA)	  
 
Subsequent to their review of New Zealand’s consumer protection laws, the MCA is 
recommending the need to adopt a more responsive approach to enforcement. 
 
In their 2005 Discussion Paper on the ‘Review of Industry-Led Regulation’, they 
acknowledge the merits of using the regulatory pyramid: 
“The regulatory environment can be modelled in terms of a pyramid showing the 
increasing level of intervention in a particular market. The pyramid also shows the 
extent to which regulation is binding on market participants.” 
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Pyramid presented in the MCA’s 2005 Discussion Paper: 
 
 
 
The Commission goes on to acknowledge the need for increased levels of 
enforcement: 
“Compared with the range of sanctions available in similar legislation overseas, New 
Zealand's FTA [Fair Trade Commission] lacks a number of sanctions particularly 
those that are represented in the mid levels of the pyramid of responsive regulation.” 
 
In recognition of this deficiency, the MCA’s 2006 “Review of the Redress and 
Enforcement Provisions of Consumer Protection Law” emphasises the need for New 
Zealand’s consumer protection law to better embrace a hierarchical regulatory 
strategy (as presented in the regulatory pyramid) where there is greater capacity for 
escalation and a greater range of sanctions in the event of non-compliance: 
“According to the pyramid theory of responsive regulation, compliance is best 
secured by the use of persuasion and negotiation techniques. To be effective, however, 
these techniques have to be supported by a range of escalating sanctions which can 
be applied or used depending upon the level of cooperation by the business and the 
seriousness of the contravention. When a range of sanctions is available, lower level 
enforcement measures are more effective. The threat of more severe forms of 
punishment encourages businesses to comply.” 
 
They illustrate this approach with a further pyramid: 
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Although little evidence of any concrete application of a responsive regulatory 
approach is yet available, the Commission’s recommendations highlight a growing 
recognition of the importance of a responsive approach in ensuring compliance with 
consumer protection legislation.  
 
For more information 
Ministry of Consumer Affairs (2006) “Review of the Redress and Enforcement 
Provisions of Consumer Protection Law”, International Comparison Discussion 
Paper, New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, online at:  
<http://www.consumeraffairs.govt.nz/policylawresearch/enforcement-review/paper-
two/paper-two-02.html#P31_5941> 
 
Ministry of Consumer Affairs (2005) “Review of Industry-Led Regulation”, 
Discussion Paper, New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, online at:  
Part 1: <http://www.consumeraffairs.govt.nz/policylawresearch/industry-led-
regulation/discussion/discussion-03.html#P120_16097>  
Part 2: <http://www.consumeraffairs.govt.nz/policylawresearch/enforcement-
review/paper-two/paper-two-05.html#LOC_P294_40175> 
 
Workplace	  Health	  and	  Safety	  
 
New Zealand’s ‘Workplace Health and Safety Strategy to 2015’ sets out principles for 
an effective regulatory system for WHS, focusing on the need for a responsive 
approach: 
“Persuasion by the regulator combined with an underlying threat of punishment will 
be enough to ensure compliance by most other employers. Stronger enforcement 
actions will be required, however, for businesses that purposefully breach the law. 
Regulators must target the worst offenders and eliminate their negative influence on 
the rest of the business community. This will help lift standards across the board and 
provide a stronger culture of compliance.” 
And it recommends that: 
 “…regulators use a flexible approach to intervention, depending on the motivations 
and responses of individual employers.” 
 
For more information: 
“Approaches to Intervention to Improve Workplace Health and Safety”, online at: 
<www.whss.govt.nz/resources/ApproachesInterventionAugust2004.pdf> 
 
Workplace Health and Safety Strategy for New Zealand to 2015: 
<http://www.whss.govt.nz/> 
 
The European Union 
REACh:	  Chemical	  Regulation	  Policy	  
 
The core component of REACh (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
restriction of Chemicals) is the requirement that manufacturers or importers of 
chemicals sold in the EU register them with a central European Chemicals Agency, to 
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ensure that all risk-related information can be made publicly available. In the absence 
of registration, the manufacture and sale of the chemicals will be prohibited. In other 
words: “no data, no market”. 
This new approach means that all major responsibility is placed with business rather 
than administrative bodies. That is not to say it is not done in a demanding manner. In 
fact the requirements are highly rigorous with producers obliged to collect and 
provide information about the entire production chain of the chemical and to reduce 
risks at every stage of production, should they wish to sell it. 
Fuhr and Bizer argue that: 
“…REACh is nothing less than a paradigm shift in the regulatory approach of the 
EU…The REACh proposal is bringing about a paradigm shift towards self-
responsibility of agents and responsive regulation.” This is because, unlike 
mandatory regulation’s assumption that regulatees will follow state-directed 
command-and-control policies, the starting point of REACh’s approach is the self-
interest of the involved parties – that is, it imposes self-responsibility on 
manufacturers and makes them liable for any damages. As Fuhr and Bizer (2007) put 
it: “The “carrots and sticks” approach, characteristic [of] responsive regulation, is 
applied by REACh to the regulation of chemicals.” There are, however, weaknesses 
in this approach. Specifically, Fuhr and Bizer (2007) argue that there is a need for 
greater incentives to support the self-responsibility regulative approach, should the 
initiative wish to achieve widespread participation and compliance.  
 
For more information: 
Health and Safety Executive, “REACH”, UK Government, online at: 
<http://www.hse.gov.uk/reach/> 
 
European Commission, “REACH”, online at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/reach_intro.htm> 
 
Fuhr, M. and K. Bizer, 2007, “REACh as a paradigm shift in chemical policy – 
responsive regulation and behavioural models”, Journal of Cleaner Production, 
15(4): 327-334. 
 
THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Dutch	  Food	  and	  Consumer	  Product	  Safety	  Authority	  
 
Mascini and Van Wijk refer to the widespread use of responsive regulation in 
Netherlands, pointing to the embrace of the approach by the Dutch tax office, labor 
inspectorate and environmental inspection agency (p.27). 
 
However, in their 2009 article on The Netherlands’ Food and Consumer Product 
Safety Authority, the authors identify a series of obstacles to regulating responsively: 
“First, it is not always clear which enforcement style should be utilized because 
inspectors apply enforcement styles inconsistently. Second…inspectors may not 
succeed in applying the most suitable style. They can encounter language barriers or 
ambiguous or rigid rules, or the application of the most apt style can interfere with 
achieving higher priority goals. Third, it is clear that negative unintended 
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consequences are not restricted to businesses targeted for a deterrent approach by 
inspectors. They often occur even when inspectors wish to act persuasively because 
regulatees tend to perceive their behavior as more coercive than intended by 
inspectors.” 
The authors argue that these difficulties are not restricted to their case-study but 
highlight an underlying problem with the applicability of responsive regulation 
theory. 
 
For more information: 
Mascini, P. and E. Van Wijk (2009) “Responsive regulation at the Dutch Food and 
Consumer Product Safety Authority: An empirical assessment of assumptions 
underlying the theory”, Regulation & Governance, (2009) 3, pp.27-47, online at: 
<http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/122310190/PDFSTART> 
 
The	  Table	  of	  Eleven	  
 
In an effort to improve “compliance friendliness”, the Dutch Ministry of Justice and 
Erasmus University pioneered the development of the “Table of Eleven” key 
determinants of compliance. This is used to both guide reviews of compliance and 
enforcement relating to existing legislation and it is also used as an analytical tool in 
the development of new regulation.  The table is structured in a way similar to the 
regulatory pyramid, with three distinct levels: 
1. Spontaneous compliance dimensions – these are factors which affect the incidence 
of voluntary compliance, that is, compliance which would occur in the absence of 
enforcement (including level of knowledge and understanding of the rules, benefits 
and costs of complying, level of acceptance of the reasonableness of the regulations, 
general attitudes to compliance by the target group and “informal control”) 
2. Control dimensions – these determine the probability of detection of non-
complying behaviour (for example by third parties, inspectors) 
3. Sanctions dimensions – this is the expected value of sanctions for non-compliance, 
that is the probability of a sanction being imposed where non-compliance is detected 
and the severity and type of likely sanctions 
 
For more info 
Jacobs, S.H. (1999) “Regulatory Reform in the Netherlands”, OECD. 
 
OECD (2009) “Better Regulation in the Netherlands”, OECD, online at: 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/13/43307757.pdf> 
 
OECD (2002) “Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries: from Interventionism to 
Regulatory Governance”, OECD, online at:  
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/fias.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/BRG_Toolsimproveexistingre
g_Other7/$FILE/7.RegulatoryPoliciesOECDCountries.pdf> (chapter 5, p.79) 
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THE UNITED STATES 
 
Oregon	  Patient	  Safety	  Commission	  
In 2009, the Oregon Patient Safety Commission was asked by the Senate Health Care 
Committee, to form a working group to offer recommendations for enhancing nursing 
home quality. Of the six core recommendations made, the working group’s first 
recommendation was “to develop models and concepts that encourage responsive 
regulation by the state and independent quality improvement action by nursing 
homes.” 
As part of this recommendation, the working group developed the following 
regulatory pyramid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The pyramid, it is stated, is based on a series of assumptions, including 
• An emphasis on learning rather than blaming cultures 
• A belief in open and frank information sharing 
• An assertion that punishment is more effective when persuasion is attempted 
first and the recognition that all stakeholder actions must commence (where 
possible) at the base of the pyramid 
• A belief that quality improvement requires that both public and private actions 
be applied and reinforced in a consistent approach and that single, isolated 
actions are seldom sufficient 
• That there is a need for real and immediate escalation should persuasion or 
voluntary actions fail 
 
For more information: 
Oregon Patient Safety Commission (2010) “Report of the Nursing Home Quality and 
Regulation Work Group”, July 6, Draft Only.  
 
